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Mentally Misguided: How State of Mind
Inquiries Ignore Psychological Reality
and Overlook Cultural Differences
JUSTIN D. LEVINSON*
“The ability to posit mental states in other people is among the most
subtly remarkable of human feats.”1
INTRODUCTION
The law constantly tries to make sense of people’s thoughts.  Did
former NBA star Jayson Williams purposely cover up the shooting of
his chauffeur?  Did Texaco executives intentionally discriminate
against employees based on race?  Did WorldCom CEO Bernie Eb-
bers knowingly preside over massive fraud?  Each of these questions,
and legal liability itself, frequently rests upon insight into the mental
states of various actors.  By requiring a subjective inquiry into the
human mind in dozens of legal disciplines, the law unsurprisingly calls
for an understanding of the way people think.  What is surprising,
however, is that policymakers develop law related to the human mind
without an understanding of the human mind itself.  Outside of the
legal context, this understanding continues to evolve as psychologists
pursue research on how mental states are perceived and judged.  In
light of such research, particularly new studies that reveal cultural dif-
ferences in mental state judgments, legal commentators now must
question not only whether existing mental state standards diverge
from true decision-making processes, but also whether such standards
ignore cultural differences.
* Assistant Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai’i
at Mānoa.  The author would like to thank Virginia Hench, Christine Jolls, Kaiping Peng, Junqi
Shi, and the University of Hawai’i Law Library librarians and staff for their support and com-
ments.  All errors are the author’s.
1. Angeline Lillard, Developing a Cultural Theory of Mind: The CIAO Approach, 8 CUR-
RENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 57 (1999).
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When criminal law2 asks whether a defendant acted intentionally,
with a conscious object, or knowingly, it asks jurors to decide what
was in the defendant’s mind at a certain point in time, which could
have been months or even years prior.  At trial, the defendant rarely
concedes that he or she intended to commit a harmful act.3  The only
way to know with certainty what the defendant was thinking would
require mind-reading access at the moment of the crime.  Because
such retrospective clairvoyance is not possible, the next best thing is to
have fact-finders make a determination.  So long as the defendant
claims it was unintentional, however, jurors have only circumstantial
evidence to rely upon.  Sometimes this evidence is strong, other times
it is not.  Either way, the law leaves the decision regarding a defen-
dant’s mental state up to a panel of citizens.  When such a complex
inquiry becomes the lynchpin of legal liability, the law should demand
to understand whether a panel of citizens can actually apply its mental
state standards.  This understanding must not just include a compari-
son of legal tests to the psychological reality of the cultural majority,
but must also consider whether legal standards can be fairly applied
by jurors of all cultural backgrounds.  These issues can be condensed
into two basic inquiries: (1) Does the law understand the way people
think; and (2) Are cultural differences in the way people think appro-
priately reflected in legal standards?
This Article analyzes these questions and presents the empirical
results of a study I conducted to test how people judge actors’ states of
mind in criminal situations.  This study first investigated whether
laypersons psychologically understand others’ mental states in a man-
ner consistent with American criminal law.4  Second, it investigated
whether the perceivers’ cultural background systematically affects the
way they judge others’ mental states.  Results of this study are ana-
2. I focus primarily on criminal law rather than on other legal disciplines’ mental state
inquiries because of the readily available variety of tests that could be employed in an empirical
study.
3. When defendants do concede the intentionality of their actions, many claim affirmative
defenses (such as self-defense).
4. The examination of embedded psychological notions in the law constitutes a relatively
new field and includes previous work by the author. See Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng,
Different Torts for Different Cohorts: A Cultural Psychological Critique of Tort Law’s Actual
Cause and Foreseeability Inquiries, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 195 (2004); Justin D. Levinson et
al., Let’s Make a Deal: Understanding the Cultural Psychological Basis of Contract Formation




lyzed with reference to how such differences fit within the American
legal framework.5
Section I of this Article describes and critiques criminal law’s sub-
jective mens rea inquiry.  It highlights a primary theme of mens rea
scholarship: that while the law heavily relies upon the truth of the in-
quiries, the subjective inquiries themselves are almost impossible to
prove.  Section II turns to psychology to explore how the social sci-
ences deconstruct mental states.  Psychologists have begun to reveal
important links connecting psychology, intentionality and legal deci-
sion-making.  Section III casts the challenge of understanding mental
states into a cultural lens. After exploring research documenting the
importance of culture in decision-making, I ask whether American le-
gal standards are unconsciously framed in a culturally biased way.
Section IV describes an empirical study I conducted to test my pri-
mary hypotheses.  First, I predicted that mens rea standards only occa-
sionally match human psychological processes.  Next, I predicted that
people from different cultures would explain criminal mental states in
systematically different ways.  The results generally corroborated
these predictions and provided a few unanticipated twists.  Section V
concludes.
I. MENS REA’S HIERARCHICAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT
SUBJECTIVE MENTAL STATES
By understanding the psychological basis for the way people
make judgments about others’ states of mind, we can begin to im-
prove (or challenge, if necessary) the implementation of psychologi-
cally embedded laws.6  Scholars have not yet fully incorporated
psychological knowledge into the legal policy process, nor have they
empirically examined the psychological mechanisms involved in un-
derstanding others’ minds in the legal setting.
Even without testing legal mental state standards for psychologi-
cal consistency, legal commentators are well versed in the challenges
5. Other than in a few footnotes, international law assumptions and implications are not
critiqued in this Article, but emerge as a natural area for cultural examination.  For example,
when non-Western cultural communities adopt Westernized laws, cultural psychological biases in
the laws themselves may frustrate well intentioned policy decisions.
6. Judging people’s states of mind is pervasive in the law and crosses legal disciplines and
boundaries.  Despite the focus of this paper on mens rea as a prime example, improving the law
to account for psychological knowledge is not limited to any one area of the law.  From tort laws
on battery to probate law on capacity, from corporate fraud law to constitutional law on discrim-
ination, the law is saturated with important references to understanding the minds of others.
2005] 3
Howard Law Journal
of mens rea’s subjective mental state inquiries, and have perceived
mens rea as “nearly impossible to read.”7  Even the Supreme Court
has noted “the variety, disparity and confusion of [judicial] definitions
of the requisite but elusive mental element.”8 Difficulty surrounds
mens rea because understanding another person’s state of mind in-
volves a difficult psychological inquiry.
Despite a varied and sometimes confused history,9 the mens rea
inquiry looks at a specific actor’s subjective mental state at the time of
the crime.10  Such a subjective inquiry magnifies the importance of
psychology.  Rather than asking jurors to judge whether an actor or
action was immoral or evil (as was the case historically),11 jurors are
asked to determine what the defendant was thinking at the time of the
crime.  The Model Penal Code (MPC) builds on this approach by re-
quiring analysis of the defendant’s state of mind with respect to each
element of an offense.12
Do Legal Hierarchies Match Psychological Ones?
The MPC’s hierarchy of mental states sets forth an incremental,
linear approach to mental states and culpability.13  That is, for crimes
with similar harms, the “higher” the mental state (i.e., the more inten-
tional), the more severe the crime.  As some commentators have
pointed out, however, successfully using the hierarchy approach to de-
termine culpability depends on the truth of the hierarchy.14  There are
a number of reasons why the mens rea hierarchy might not work, even
7. Adam Candeub, Comment, Motive Crimes and Other Minds, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 2071,
2075 (1994). See also D.E. Blackman, On the Mental Element in Crime and Behaviorism, in LAW
AND PSYCHOLOGY, PAPERS PRESENTED AT SSRC LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY CONFERENCES 1979-
1980, 113 (Sally Lloyd-Bostock ed. 1981).
8. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
9. Martin R. Gardner, The  Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the
Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 638 (1993) (calling mens rea “elusive”).
10. In this Article, I focus on the initial (subjective) mens rea inquiry.  Some mens rea laws,
such as those dealing with affirmative defenses, do import objective notions of the “reasonable
person.”
11. Gardner, supra note 9, at 640.
12. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (1985).  The Model Penal Code (or variations of it) has
been codified by well over half of the states in the U.S.  William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and
Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 657-58 (1994) (pointing out that thirty-seven states had
adopted some or all of the MPC). See also Gerald E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code,
Second (Federal?): The Challenge of the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 297 (1998) (high-
lighting the influence of the MPC on judicial thinking and legal education as well as in state law).
13. The hierarchy approach is not limited to the MPC, though it serves as a clear example.
Hierarchical notions are present in common law as well, and even outside of criminal law.
14. Kenneth W. Simons, Should The Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be
Amended? 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 180 (2003).
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when legislative and judicial processes carefully define hierarchical
mental states.  Evidence suggests that jurors might not listen to, re-
member, or use instructions about the meaning of certain mental state
levels.15  Rather than remembering the legal definition or properly ap-
plying jury instructions, however, jurors probably will rely on their
common sense understanding of others’ states of mind.16  Some schol-
ars argue that jurors consciously or unconsciously apply more general
moral constructions in making decisions.17  In any case (or in some
combination), jurors will make state of mind determinations based
mostly upon their lay conceptions of state of mind.18
Commentators have debated the effectiveness of the MPC hierar-
chy of mental states.  Scholar Larry Alexander has argued that the top
three categories—purpose, knowledge and recklessness—do not serve
distinct purposes and therefore can all be reduced to one category:
recklessness.19  Like recklessness, he argues, purpose and knowledge
exhibit the “basic moral vice” of insufficient concern for the interests
of others.20  Joshua Dressler disagrees, arguing that “common intui-
tion” dictates that one mens rea category cannot possibly account for
15. Research findings in a variety of areas indicate that jurors often do not listen to instruc-
tions. See Jonathan D. Casper & Kennette M. Benedict, The Influence of Outcome Information
and Attitudes on Juror Decision Making in Search and Seizure Cases, in INSIDE THE JUROR 65
(Reid Hastie ed., 1993) (indicating that jurors cannot ignore instructions to disregard evidence).
For example, jurors have been shown to ignore standards for insanity.  A variety of studies indi-
cated that mock jurors’ insanity acquittal rates did not differ when different versions of the
insanity instruction were given. See Norman J. Finkel, The Insanity Defense: A Comparison of
Verdict Schemas, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 533 (1991); Norman J. Finkel, The Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984: Much Ado About Nothing, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 403 (1989).  Examination of
insanity acquittals in states that changed formulations also revealed no differences.  Such results
might indicate that jurors do not pick up distinctions in mental state notions such as insanity or
may decide based on lay concepts of insanity.  However, another possibility is that the standards
are not so different from one another. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMI-
NAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 956 (6th ed. 1995).
16. Some scholars have focused on notions of “common sense justice” to support positions
like this one. See Norman J. Finkel, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS’ NOTIONS OF THE LAW
(1995) (distinguishing between “common sense” and “commonsense”); PAUL H. ROBINSON &
JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1995); RITA JAMES SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967); Norman J. Finkel
& Jennifer L. Groscup, When Mistakes Happen: Commonsense Rules of Culpability, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 65 (1997).
17. Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage, Erratic Awards, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW
JURIES DECIDE 31 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002); see also Dan Simon, A Third View of the
Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (2004).
18. By relying on juries to import notions of community values, the law assumes as much.
See  RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM (2003).
19. Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Liability, 88




variations in criminal culpability.21  He states that “[a] bright line test
is indefensible . . . unless it produces results closely approximating
those which persons, left to their own devices, would reach on a case-
by-case basis.”22  Even with this debate and Dressler’s reference to lay
conceptions of mental state, no empirical studies have examined
whether the legal hierarchy of mental states matches lay mental state
judgments.
II. HOW PSYCHOLOGY ALLOWS US TO UNDERSTAND
MENTAL STATE JUDGMENTS
From a purely psychological perspective, it is fundamental to ex-
plore the way that people explain behavior.  Such explanations of be-
havior, known as “folk explanations,” help guide people’s
understanding of each other, as well as enable them to adapt and
shape their lives accordingly.23
Developmental psychologists were among the first to investigate
folk explanations.24  In investigating how and when children acquire
the ability to understand others’ behaviors in daily life, psychologists
found that children only fourteen months old can understand interper-
sonal behavior in basic “intention-relevant” units.25  At just eighteen
months, children develop the ability to infer another person’s inten-
tions.26  While the legal relevance of these studies was not self-evident
to psychologists or legal commentators, in hindsight the methodology
began to reveal how psychological research on intentionality could
eventually help to critique and improve legal knowledge of mental
state judgments.
An important historical shift occurred when psychologists at-
tempted to build a model to explain adult, rather than child, folk in-
21. Joshua Dressler, Does One Mens Rea Fit All?: Thoughts on Alexander’s Unified Con-
ception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 955 (2000).
22. Id. at 963.
23. Bertram F. Malle, How People Explain Behavior: A New Theoretical Framework, 3 PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 23, 23 (1999).
24. See HENRY M. WELLMAN, THE CHILD’S THEORY OF MIND (1990).
25. Bertram F. Malle, The Relation Between Language and Theory of Mind in Development
and Evolution, in THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE OUT OF PRE-LANGUAGE 265, 267 (T. Givon
& Bertram Malle eds., 2002); see also Karen Bartsch & Henry M. Wellman, Young Children’s
Attribution of Action to Beliefs and Desires, 60 CHILD DEV. 946, 958 (1989).  In Bartsch and
Wellman’s study, children were asked: “Why is Jane looking for the kitten under the piano?”  A
common response: “She thinks it’s under there.” Id.; Alison Gopnik & Andrew N. Meltzoff, The
Child’s Theory of Action, in WORDS, THOUGHTS AND THEORIES 125 (Alison Gopnik & Andrew
Meltzoff eds., 1997).
26. Malle, supra note 25, at 267.
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tentionality.27  In one such endeavor, psychologists Bertram Malle and
Joshua Knobe theorized that adults reference identifiable categories
when judging other people’s behavior.  Their study indicated that per-
ceivers refer to five categories when judging an actor’s behavior as
intentional: the actor must have (1) a desire for an outcome; (2) be-
liefs about a behavior leading to that outcome; (3) resulting intention
to perform that behavior; (4) the skill to perform the behavior; and (5)
the awareness of fulfilling the intention while performing the behav-
ior.28  Malle and Knobe’s article did not specifically discuss legal im-
plications of their findings, but the connection emerged in one of
Malle’s subsequent works.
Building on Malle’s prior work, Malle and Sarah Nelson explicitly
argued for a psychologically competent legal model of intentionality.29
They argued that legal mens rea standards should be based upon
mental state conceptions consistent with human inference, instead of
creating a disconnect between the existing legal framework and psy-
chological knowledge.30  More specifically, they argued that Malle and
Knobe’s five-step system of intentionality should become the bedrock
for mens rea judgments, rather than the variety of legal standards used
today.31  Their arguments took a big step forward by integrating psy-
chological knowledge into mens rea scholarship.  However, Malle and
Nelson did not conduct empirical research on state of mind attribu-
tions in the legal context.32  Nor did they discuss whether jurors have
access to the detailed evidence needed to make judgments in a man-
ner consistent with the five-step system.  Yet, their logic craftily un-
derscores the disconnect between legal policymaking and knowledge
of the human mind.  In doing so, they set the stage for empirical inves-
tigation of various standards of mental states in the legal context.
Even though no psychologists have tested how jurors actually
make mens rea judgments, empirical research illustrates the legal im-
27. Bertram F. Malle & Joshua Knobe, The Folk Concept of Intentionality, 33 J. EXPERI-
MENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 101 (1997).
28. Id. See also Bertram F. Malle & Joshua Knobe, Which Behaviors Do People Explain?
A Basic Actor-Observer Asymmetry, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 288 (1997).
29. Bertram F. Malle & Sarah E. Nelson, Judging Mens Rea: The Tension Between Folk
Concepts and Legal Concepts of Intentionality, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 563 (2003).
30. Id. Malle and Nelson do point out, however, that notions of “intentionality” that Malle
and Knobe tested are likely different from notions of “intent” tested in the law.  See Joshua
Knobe, Intention, Intentional Action and Moral Considerations, 64 ANALYSIS 181  (2004), for a
discussion of the language-based differences of “intentionality” and “intent.”
31. Malle & Nelson, supra note 29, at 569.
32. Instead, their empirical work focused on building theories related to intentionality in
the legal context.  For example, they tested the relationship between intentionality and blame.
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portance of mental state judgments in guilty verdicts.  This research
indicates that jurors rely heavily on information about a defendant’s
mental state when making culpability judgments.  Psychologists Nor-
man Finkel and Jennifer Groscup examined notions of criminal culpa-
bility and punishment judgments in the context of mistake of fact and
mistake of law.33  In the study’s questionnaires, Finkel and Groscup
created hypothetical fact patterns that varied actors’ mental state
levels and victims’ harm levels in order to determine how laypersons
make culpability determinations when presented with such varying
circumstances.34  When testing the role of an actor’s mental state in
culpability judgments, they consistently found that culpability deter-
minations begin and end with notions of intentionality.35  By far the
strongest factor in participants’ culpability judgments was an actor’s
mental state.  If, as Finkel and Groscup suggest, intentionality is truly
the beginning and end of culpability judgments, then understanding
how jurors determine defendants’ mental states should be fundamen-
tally important to criminal law.
Despite the strides taken by Finkel and Groscup’s study, a key
question remained unanswered: how do perceivers make mental state
judgments?  After all, the prosecution and defense rarely agree upon
a defendant’s mental state.  The prosecution might argue that a defen-
dant formed a specific intention to murder the victim.  The defense
might argue that the killing was not at all intentional, but instead oc-
curred negligently.  Either way, the mens rea of the defendant fre-
quently remains unsettled and emerges as the focus of debate, with
attorneys for both sides marshalling circumstantial evidence to argue
the point.
Psychological research, therefore, has taught us two important
lessons: that mental state judgments truly matter in criminal culpabil-
ity judgments, and that understanding how people judge others’
mental states is a worthwhile and manageable endeavor.  These two
33. Finkel & Groscup, supra note 16, at 67.
34. Yet, Finkel and Groscup did not test how participants made mental state judgments.
Instead, they presented mental state information as a given, manipulated “levels” of mental
state, and judged reactions to such manipulations within a factual scenario.  For example, in a
high intentionality condition, study participants were told that an actor intended to shoot a tree
stump, but instead shot a victim. See  John M. Darley et al., Community Standards for Defining
Attempt, 39 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 405 (1996) (comparing legal standards to community views
about attempt, but assuming mental states as a known factor); John M. Darley & Charles W.
Huff, Heightened Damage Assessment as a Result of the Intentionality of the Damage Causing
Act, 29 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (1990).
35. Finkel & Groscup, supra note 16, at 101.
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lessons merge to create a simple conclusion: testing how mens rea
judgments are made enables us to reform our laws consistent with its
stated goals.
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT
BEHAVIORAL ATTRIBUTIONS VARY
ACROSS CULTURES
If jurors do not make decisions in a manner consistent with mens
rea tests, reformers should modify such tests to match both policy
goals and psychological reality.  Similarly, if only some jurors (such as
those from identifiable majority cultural backgrounds) make decisions
consistently with legal tests, such tests should be reformed to elimi-
nate cultural bias.  This cultural issue can be broken down into two
parts.  The first part focuses on culture and cultural psychology36 by
exploring how culture systematically influences the way people make
judgments about others’ states of mind.  The second part focuses on
the legal application: how should the law incorporate an understand-
ing of cultural psychology into the law’s goals?
A. How Does Culture Influence the Way People Make
Judgments?
Like legal scholarship, psychological research, including folk in-
tentionality studies,37 often assumes the universality of human thought
and ignores the influences of cultural differences.38  According to psy-
chologist Richard Nisbett and his colleagues, “when psychologists per-
form experiments . . . it does not normally occur to them that their
data may only apply rather locally, to people raised in a tradition of
European culture.”39  However, work by cultural psychologists indi-
cates that sets of basic beliefs about others’ minds and behavior differ
36. Scholars define cultural psychology as the study of “the way the human mind can be
transformed, given shape and definition, and made functional in numerous ways that are not
uniformly distributed across cultural communities.”  Levinson & Peng, supra note 4, at 203. See
also Richard A. Schewder, Cultural Psychology—What is It?, in READINGS IN CULTURAL PSY-
CHOLOGY: THEORETICAL, METHODOLOGICAL AND EMPIRICAL 23 (Kaiping Peng ed., 2000) (stat-
ing “[a] discipline is emerging called ‘cultural psychology’. . . and its time may have arrived”).
37. Folk intentionality research is more broadly referred to as “theory of minds” research.
38. Richard E. Nisbett et al., Culture and Systems of Thought, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 291
(2001); see also Angeline Lillard, Ethnopsychologies: Cultural Variations in Theories of Mind,
123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1998).  It is worth noting that brain studies in other areas of psychology,
such as language acquisition, have shown cultural differences.  M.W. Chee et al., Mandarin and
English Single Word Processing Studied with Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 19 J.
NEUROSCIENCE 3050 (1999).
39. Nisbett et al., supra note 38, at 305.
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across cultures.40  Working within the context of theory of mind and
folk intentionality research, psychologist Angeline Lillard confronted
cultural ignorance by systematically reviewing the principles underly-
ing theory of mind research, giving each a cultural perspective.41
Though she did not empirically test her theories, she used both cul-
tural psychological works and anthropology-based ethnographies to
support her claims.42
Lillard summarized her theory of mind research as containing
two different lines of thought.  “Theory theory” proposes that people
derive ideas about others solely from available evidence.  It is known
as a “scientist model of people as learners.”43  The other line of
thought highlights “simulation,” or the process whereby people place
themselves in the shoes of the actor.  As Lillard described, simulation
“enables [people] to read minds because they re-evoke the other’s
mental state in themselves.”44
Under either “theory theory” or “simulation” processes, Lillard
argued, the impact of culture has been ignored.45  “Theory theory”
assumes that others do things to fulfill their desires so long as nothing
is impeding them (e.g. “he is walking toward something because he
wants it”).46  All cultures, however, do not think of mental states as
preceding behavior.  For example, Samoans traditionally define an ac-
tion by its effect rather than the actor’s intention.47  Therefore, in
40. Id.; see generally Lillard, supra note 38.
41. Lillard, supra note 38; see Henry Wellman, Culture, Variation, and Levels of Analysis in
Folk Psychologies: Comment on Lillard, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 33 (1998) (responding to Lillard’s
article and calling a cultural understanding of theory of mind “a sorely needed endeavor”); see
also Mary Gauvain, Culture, Development, and Theory of Mind: Comment on Lillard, 123
PSYCHOL. BULL. 37 (1998) (pointing out that adding a cultural dimension to theory of mind work
enhances, rather than undermines, the theory).
42. Lillard, supra note 38, at 7.  Unlike Lillard, psychologists Tardif and Wellman did empir-
ically test conceptions of mental states across cultures in children in China and the U.S., finding
only minimal cultural differences, particularly relating to timing of development.  Though these
findings are interesting, they tend to indicate that cultural differences in state of mind develop
after a certain age, rather than indicating that there are no cultural differences in understanding
mental states.  Twila Tardif & Henry M. Wellman, Acquisition Of Mental State Language in Man-
darin- and Cantonese-Speaking Children, 36 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 25 (2000).  Cultural
Psychology as a discipline is examined infra page 11.
43. Lillard, supra note 38, at 5; see Alison Gopnik & Henry M. Wellman, The Theory The-
ory, in MAPPING THE MIND: DOMAIN SPECIFICITY IN COGNITION AND CULTURE 257 (Lawrence
A. Hirschfeld & Susan A. Gelman eds., 1994).
44. Lillard, supra note 38, at 4; see J. Heal, Simulation v. Theory Theory: What is at Issue, in
OBJECTIVITY, SIMULATION, AND THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 129 (C. Peacocke ed., 1994).
45. Lillard, supra note 38, at 4-5.
46. Some jurisdictions attempt to simplify things for jurors by giving similar instructions.
Such instructions suffer from the same cultural shortcomings as “theory theory.”
47. Lillard, supra note 38, at 13.
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some cultures, assumptions underlying “theory theory” might not be
valid.48  “Simulation’s” cultural insensitivity derives from the assump-
tion that people can effectively project themselves into the role of an
actor.  For members of the same culture, such a projection might not
be difficult.  However, perceivers from different cultures will perceive
events based on their own experiences and perspectives.  When the
actor and observers have different cultural backgrounds, such a pro-
jection becomes even more difficult and may involve in-group prefer-
ences and out-group stereotypes.49
In a more recent work, Lillard expanded her cross-cultural expla-
nation of theory of minds to incorporate within-U.S. cultural differ-
ences.50  The new theory of minds model that she created highlighted
the importance of culture in understanding other states of mind.  For
example, Lillard described how urban American children tend to use
internal psychological attributions (“he helped me to catch bugs be-
cause he and I like to catch bugs”) and rural American children more
frequently use situational attributions (“she helped me pick up my
books, because if she didn’t I would have missed the bus”).51
B. Empirical Studies: Culture Has a Systematic Influence on
Judgments
In a related, but broader empirical effort, cultural psychologists
over the past decade have discovered how perceptions, attributions,
and decision-making processes differ across cultures.52  Even cognitive
biases and the fundamental attribution error, which legal commenta-
48. Even so, its evidence is strong in European American culture, where the role of inten-
tionality in explaining behavior has even expanded to inanimate objects (consider the phrase
“the car does not want to start”).  Lillard, supra note 38, at 7.
49. See discussion of in-group and out-group biases, Justin D. Levinson, Mens Rea: A Psy-
chologically Embedded Inquiry (unpublished L.L.M. Thesis, Harvard University) (on file with
Harvard Law School Library) (2004); see also Daniel R. Ames, Inside the Mind Reader’s Tool
Kit: Projection and Stereotyping in Mental State Inference, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
340, 341 (2004).  Ames argues that when perceivers are dissimilar to their “mind-reading”
targets, they are more likely to use stereotypes to make mental state inferences.
50. Lillard, supra note 1, at 59. In doing so, she proposed a new approach to theory of mind,
called the “CIAO” (culture, introspection, analogy, and ontogeny) model.
51. Lillard noted that these situational rural American responses resemble Chinese Con-
fucian thought patterns. Id.
52. Nisbett et al., supra note 38; Li-Jun Ji et al., Culture, Control, and Perception of Rela-
tionships in the Environment, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 943 (2000); Michael W. Mor-
ris & Kaiping Peng, Culture and Cause: American and Chinese Attributions for Social and
Physical Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 949 (1994); Ara Norenzayan et al., Cul-
tural Similarities and Differences in Social Inference: Evidence from Behavioral Predictions and
Lay Theories of Behavior, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 109 (2002); see also Levin-
son et al., supra note 4.
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tors often examine as if they applied equally to all people, have been
shown to be culturally bounded.53  Using their new knowledge about
cultural differences, researchers have developed overarching models
about culture and decision-making.  In particular, studies comparing
Eastern and Western models of thought have yielded fascinating re-
sults that lend themselves to historical and cultural explanations.
Some of the more theoretical work comparing East Asian and
American patterns of thought focuses on reasoning processes and con-
tradiction.54  For example, psychologists Peng and Nisbett examined
the influence of Chinese notions of changeability and flux compared
to Western notions of linearity, formal logic, and non-contradiction.55
They presented participants with two potentially contradictory state-
ments.  For example, participants read statement A: “Two mathemati-
cians have discovered that the activities of a butterfly in Beijing,
China, noticeably affect the temperature in the San Francisco Bay
Area.” Participants then read statement B: “Two meteorologists have
found that the activities of a local butterfly in the San Francisco Bay
Area have nothing to do with temperature changes in the same San
Francisco Bay Area.”56
When asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with the
statements, after reading the second, potentially contradictory state-
ment, Americans agreed more with the first statement they read and
less with the second statement (compared to when they viewed the
statements in isolation).57  It did not matter which of the two state-
ments was presented first.  Chinese, on the other hand, believed both
statements more when presented with the seemingly contradictory in-
formation of the second statement.58  That is, Chinese not only toler-
ated contradiction, but also were more likely to believe each
statement when presented with potentially contradictory informa-
tion.59  Peng and Nisbett explained their results by discussing histori-
cal and cultural notions of understanding.60  Historically, Chinese
people believed that the world constantly fluctuated and demon-
53. Morris & Peng, supra note 52; Nisbett et al., supra note 38.
54. Kaiping Peng & Richard E. Nisbett, Culture, Dialectics, and Reasoning About Contra-
diction, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 741 (1999); Nisbett et al., supra note 38.
55. Peng & Nisbett, supra note 54.
56. Id. at 741.
57. Id. at 749.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 743.
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strated its interconnectedness.61  Americans, on the other hand, relied
on principles similar to Aristotelian logic, emphasizing identity and
non-contradiction.62  In the legal setting, such results raise the issue of
how a diverse group of jurors will apply legal inquiries, and whether
such inquiries may be unintentionally culturally biased.
In a multi-cultural context, Eastern notions of a world in flux may
challenge Western legal principles that attempt to isolate certain
events and specific points in time.  For example, Levinson, Peng, and
Wang looked at how Chinese and Americans evaluated contractual
behavior.63  The researchers presented participants with factual scena-
rios containing various contract formation behaviors, such as a corre-
spondence between supplier and purchaser, or negotiations between a
home resident and a painter.  After learning of a failure in each of the
deals they read about, participants were asked to both judge the con-
tractual intent and responsibility of the parties and to evaluate moral
shortcomings of the actors.  The results indicated that Chinese partici-
pants held more fluid conceptions of contracts than Americans.64
That is, because they focused on after-the-fact moral judgments in de-
termining pre-contractual intent, Chinese perceived contract forma-
tion as occurring at a specific point in time less frequently than
Americans.65  Many Western legal principles have such a time-specific
focus, including the mens rea determination. Mens rea asks whether
the defendant had a culpable state of mind at the time of the action.66
Perceivers with Eastern or similar cultural perspectives may not think
in such a time-isolated manner.
Building on general studies like those described above, cultural
psychologists have recently begun labeling certain psychological prin-
ciples as culture specific and investigating their operation.  Some of
the more interesting work has dealt with crime, responsibility, causa-
tion, and cognitive biases, though almost all such research has focused
outside the legal context.  For example, Morris and Peng studied how
participants made attributions and responsibility judgments when
presented with fact patterns relating to similar mass murders in China
61. Id.
62. Id. at 744.
63. Levinson et al., supra note 4.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Other conceptions of time isolation are pervasive in American law.  In addition to con-
tract formation and mens rea, consider other areas of law such as capacity in forming a will.
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and the U.S.67 They found that Americans explained murders by in-
voking presumed dispositions of the individual (such as the perpetra-
tor’s temperament, traits, and disposition), whereas Chinese explained
the same events with reference to contextual factors (such as bad envi-
ronments and poor interpersonal relations).68  A content analysis
proved that media reports of the murders showed the same cross-cul-
tural attribution patterns.69
Morris and Peng also tested causal attributions across cultures.70
In that study, the researchers showed participants computer simula-
tions of fish swimming.  When asked to describe why the fish swam in
various ways (e.g. swimming towards a group or away from a group),
Americans answered questions dispositionally (with regard to the in-
dividual fish) and Chinese answered questions based upon situational
factors (with regard to the group).  These findings underscore a funda-
mental difference illustrated by cultural psychology: members of East-
ern and Western cultures view events and behaviors quite differently.
Levinson, Peng, and Wang also conducted tests in the legal con-
text, and found that American participants judged that a party to a
business deal intended to be bound by the deal more frequently than
Chinese participants.71  The researchers presented participants with
stories of ambiguous business deals where the principles of offer and
acceptance were unclear.  They then asked participants to rank inten-
tionality, responsibility, and other psychological and legal measures.
The results from that study showed systematic differences in evaluat-
ing intentionality judgments and should translate beyond the contract
law setting into other legal settings, including criminal law’s mens rea
inquiry.
Another study compared cross-cultural psychological judgments
in the criminal law context.  In a well-known project, scholars Hamil-
ton and Sanders found that Americans and Japanese made attribu-
tions of responsibility and punishment quite differently.72  Americans
67. Note that these studies by psychologists focused on lay judgments, not legal judgments.
68. See Morris & Peng, supra note 52; see also Fiona Lee et al., Explaining Real Life Events:
How Culture and Domain Shape Attributions, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 732
(1996).
69. Morris & Peng, supra note 52 (conducting a coding study analyzing the newspaper arti-
cles that depicted the murders).  For other work on cultural differences in attribution patterns,
see also Li-Jun Ji et al., supra note 52; Joan Miller, Culture and the Development of Everyday
Social Explanation, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961 (1984).
70. Morris & Peng, supra note 52.
71. Levinson et al., supra note 4.
72. See generally V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE (1992).
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used mental state information in making responsibility judgments
more often than Japanese.73  Japanese tended to view an actor as part
of a situation more than Americans, focusing on the context in making
responsibility judgments.74  Although they did not initially seek to test
mental state judgments themselves, Hamilton and Sanders hypothe-
sized that perceivers based their responsibility judgments in part on
mental state variation.  To that end, they created two mental state
levels: “high” and “low.”  Participants were told either that a harm
was “accidental” (low mental state) or “done out of anger” (high
mental state).
When their manipulation checks initially turned up some results
that they initially could not explain, Hamilton and Sanders compared
American and Japanese mental state judgments, and found that
Americans more often judged mental states as intentional than Japa-
nese, while Japanese respondents more often concluded that the
mental state was negligent.75  These cultural differences resemble the
findings of Levinson, Peng, and Wang76 and lend support to the claim
that mental state attributions vary across cultures.
C. Culture within the U.S.
Cultural differences in international mental state judgments be-
tween Americans and East Asians implicate international law stan-
dards and bear on the desirability of legal transplants.77  Within the
United States, however, the importance of culture in mens rea judg-
ments depends upon the existence of cognitive differences across do-
mestic cultures.  Although cultural psychology’s most influential
studies thus far have examined culture on an international scale, some
scholars have researched cultural differences within the United States.
These studies highlight how unique cultural communities within the
U.S. hold identifiable value systems and beliefs that deviate from ma-
jority communities.  Certain American cultural communities have
been found to stress unique conceptions of time orientation, oral ex-
73. Id. at 130.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 109.
76. Levinson et al., supra note 4.  Levinson et al. tested Chinese respondents while Hamil-
ton and Sanders tested Japanese respondents.  Though results of Chinese studies and Japanese
studies are far from interchangeable, they fit into larger categories of psychological theory relat-
ing broadly to comparisons of Western and East Asian cultural patterns of thought. See Nisbett
et al., supra note 38.
77. See generally Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Cor-
porate Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 195 (2004).
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pression, interdependence, conformity, harmony with nature, relation-
ships, group welfare, and family obligations.78  Such cultural
differences likely manifest themselves not only in value systems and
behaviors, but also in cognitive patterns, including mental state judg-
ments.  To date, however, no one has explored the implications of cul-
tural differences within the U.S. on mental state judgments.79  As the
domestic power of cultural differences continues to emerge, funda-
mental inconsistencies in substantive law will become highlighted by
such knowledge.80
D. Incorporating Cultural Differences into the Law
As America has become more diverse, the importance of under-
standing culture has similarly increased.  The law, in striving to regu-
late, properly incentivize, and deter human behavior, should seek to
understand how predictable cognitive differences exist in different
groups of people.81  Certain concepts underlying the American legal
system, developed primarily by European Americans, may show a
cognitive psychological bias toward European American cultural con-
structs.  While historically such biases might have impacted a smaller
minority of people, in today’s and tomorrow’s America the impact of
having potentially culturally ignorant laws and procedures has great-
ened.  The risk is one of bias and discrimination.  If laws are formed in
a way that assumes a cultural and psychological basis of a European-
American world, then non-European Americans could get caught in a
cultural gap.  In a country where population predictions indicate a
continued increase in diversity, this cultural gap could be significant.82
Reformers must redraft laws that contain implicit cultural biases in
order to contemplate a culturally diverse country.
78. See GERARDO MARIN & BARBARA MARIN, RESEARCH WITH HISPANIC POPULATIONS
(1991); LAURA UBA, ASIAN AMERICANS: PERSONALITY PATTERNS, IDENTITY, AND MENTAL
HEALTH (1994);  James M. Jones, Racism in Black and White: A Bicultural Model of Reaction
and Evolution, in ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN CONTROVERSY 117 (Phyllis A. Katz &
Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988); Carolyn Attneave, American Indians and Alaska Native Families:
Emigrants in Their Own Homeland, in ETHNICITY AND FAMILY THERAPY 55 (Monica McGold-
rick et al. eds., 1982).
79. Such a project should follow this one, as the focus of the current empirical study was
international. See infra Section IV for a description and discussion of the study.
80. See Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community Values in Juries: How
“Legal Priming” Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1059 (2005) for
a discussion of the power of the legal culture in America.
81. See Levinson & Peng, supra note 4.
82. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Interim Projections by Age Sex Race, and Hispanic Ori-
gin, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/ (last visited 4/23/04) (displaying population
projections until 2050, based on numbers in 2000 census).
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In the current context, we must ask whether different cultural
groups apply mens rea inquiries in systematically different ways.  If we
learn that differences exist, we must investigate the origins of those
differences.  How many of the differences are solely due to the role of
diversity in decision-making (a desired result), and how many are due
to ethnocentric legal standards (an undesired result)?  For example, if
asking jurors to consider whether a defendant “intended to kill”
evokes predictably divergent reasoning processes and responses
across cultures, we must investigate whether the standard unnecessa-
rily frames or limits the culturally broad cognitive processes that
should exist in the jury system.  Can a diverse jury conduct an appro-
priate inquiry in the face of legal standards that contain embedded
cultural assumptions?
IV. EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF MENS REA IN A
CULTURAL CONTEXT
I devised a study designed to investigate how people determine
mental states and how such judgments vary across cultures.  In partic-
ular, I examined how perceivers make mental state judgments when
presented with specific mens rea inquiries.  I also tested these judg-
ment processes across cultures (in the U.S. and China) and investi-
gated how cultural differences emerged in mens rea decision-making.
A. Hypotheses:
I proposed that each mens rea inquiry carries with it a unique set
of lay psychological assumptions that impact the decision-making pro-
cess.  I further proposed that legal assumptions relating both to the
quality and hierarchy of mens rea judgments would only sometimes
corroborate with psychological results.  In addition, I predicted that
cultural differences in mental state judgments would emerge in a sys-
tematic fashion.  Following existing research that highlights Wes-
terners’ focus on an individual’s disposition when attributing blame, I
predicted that Americans would make higher mental state judgments
than Chinese.  That is, compared to Chinese perceivers, Americans




B. Methods and Materials:
I recruited participants in the United States and China.  Under-
graduate students at Beijing University participated in the study for
pay.  UC Berkeley undergraduate students taking part in a psychology
course participated in the study.83  Harvard University students who
were in a student-commons area participated for the chance to win a
gift certificate.84
I used a multiple variable design in the study.85  Participants re-
ceived one of four forms of a questionnaire.86  I originally drafted the
research materials in English with consideration for cross-cultural un-
derstanding of the concepts.  Separate bi-lingual translators converted
the survey into Chinese and then back into English.  The agreement
between translators was high.  Consulting with appropriate authori-
ties, I resolved the few discrepancies that emerged.
The scenarios presented to participants provided stories of harms
that omitted direct reference to an actor’s mental state.  That is, par-
ticipants could only infer an actor’s mental state from circumstantial
facts.87  I asked participants to complete a questionnaire that included
four fact pattern vignettes.  Each vignette presented facts in which a
person was injured by a state of mind ambiguous actor.  For example,
participants read about a woman who saw her boyfriend kissing an-
other woman.  After seeing the kiss, the woman ran out of the build-
ing crying.  Her boyfriend ran after her to her car.  While he stood
behind her car, the crying woman started the car and accelerated
quickly backward, striking her boyfriend with the car.88
83. The average age was 20.01 for the American sample and 22.18 for the Chinese sample.
60.6% of the Chinese sample was female and 56.0% of the American sample was female.
84. Id.
85. I used both “between subjects” variables and “within subjects” variables.  Between sub-
jects variables present one level of a condition to one group of randomly assigned participants,
and a separate level of the condition to another group.  Within subjects variables present both
conditions of the same variable to all participants.  See supra note 49, Levinson, for a complete
description of all of the variables.
86. Including the culture variable, there were eight forms.  Chinese participants received
forms CA, CB, CC, and CD.  American participants received AA, AB, AC, and AD.
87. The storylines forming the basis of case 2 and case 4 were adapted and modified from
Kaiping Peng & Eric Knowles, Culture, Education, and the Attribution of Physical Causality, 29
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1272 (2003).




Prior to moving on to dependent variable measures, some of the
participants were asked to complete four guilt questions.89
C. Measures
The dependent variables focused on state of mind attributions.
Some variables tested included:
1) Common Law- Intent (kill)90
2) Common Law- Intent (hurt)
3) Common Law- Extreme Recklessness (kill)
4) MPC/Common Law- Recklessness (hurt)
5) MPC- Purpose (kill)
6) MPC- Purpose (hurt)
7) MPC- Knowledge (hurt)
As indicated in the above list, I presented participants with vari-
ous mental state judgments that are similar to legal judgments, both
common law and Model Penal Code (MPC).  Questions 1 and 2 tested
the common law intentionality judgment by asking about the actor’s
intent to kill and intent to hurt.  In the murder or attempted murder
context, an intent to kill can constitute the “malice aforethought” re-
quired by common law.91  Question 3, which I refer to as the “extreme
recklessness” question, asked about an extremely reckless disregard
for the value of human life, another mental state that can qualify an
accused for common law murder.92  Question 4 tested the MPC and
common law concept of “recklessness,” which is met when an actor
“consciously disregards a substantial and unjustified risk that the ma-
terial element exists or will result from his conduct.”93  Questions 5
89. These guilt questions were designed to allow analysis of the relationship between state
of mind judgments and guilt determinations, as well as to allow for analysis of the psychological
processes whereby guilt determinations are made.  These guilt questions also allow for an exami-
nation of the impact of extraneous information and other factors on guilt determinations, as well
as a test of cultural differences on guilty verdicts.  Participants answered each of the four ques-
tions, and then continued on to the dependent variable measures that all participants received.
In addition to asking participants whether the defendant was guilty or not guilty, participants
were asked to rate “how guilty” the defendant was (on a scale of 1-100).  I call these scaled
questions “guilty scale” questions. Because of procedural differences in the legal systems, Chi-
nese participants were told to answer questions in their role as a judge, and American partici-
pants were told to answer questions in their role of a juror.
90. The category in parentheses indicates whether the mental state referred to killing the
victim or hurting the victim in order to differentiate between attempted murder and assault and
battery.
91. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 467 (2d ed. 1995).
92. Id. at 503.
93. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985). I tested conceptions of recklessness without
the justification element, which imports a separate (and unrelated to subjective mental state)
notion into the state of mind analysis.
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and 6 tested the MPC standard of “purpose,” which denotes a “con-
scious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a
result.”94  Legal commentators treat this inquiry as analogous to the
common law intent inquiry.  Question 7 tested the MPC concept of
“knowledge,” which is met when an actor is “aware that it is practi-
cally certain that his conduct will cause such a result.”95
D. Results
1. The MPC Mental State Hierarchy.  I first examined mental state
judgments in the context of testing the MPC’s mens rea hierarchy.  Ex-
amining aggregate mean responses indicated that the hierarchy of
mental states provides meaningful distinctions between levels of
mental states.  For MPC based questions that asked about mental
states relating to hurting the victim, significant variance emerged in
the MPC-anticipated order between American judgments of purpose
(m=4.11),96 knowledge (m=4.24), and recklessness (m=4.42).  These
mean scores generally demonstrate that participants maintained a folk
mental state hierarchy: purpose above knowledge above recklessness.
As confirmed by a “paired samples T-test,” the differences between
purpose and recklessness responses, as well as between purpose and
knowledge responses, were statistically significant (p<.01 and p<.05,
respectively).97  The differences between knowledge and recklessness
responses were only marginally statistically significant (p<.07).  These
results generally, though not perfectly, support a theory that meaning-
ful differences exist in MPC hierarchy levels.98
94. MODEL PENAL CODE §  2.02(2)(a)(i) (1985).
95. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (1985). There were two additional mental state
questions that I did not highlight in the summary list of mental state questions.  Questions 8 and
9 also addressed issues that can be relevant to malice aforethought judgments, particularly in
jurisdictions where degrees of murder are used.  Many state jurisdictions require that first-de-
gree murder include “willful, premeditated, deliberate” action. DRESSLER, supra note 91, at 469-
70.  In many contexts, willful is defined as analogous to intent, embodied in Questions 1 and 2.
Premeditation asks whether the defendant thought about acting beforehand or whether the ac-
tion was committed impulsively.  The inquiry into the nature of “deliberate” action asks whether
the actor considered the effects and consequences before acting.  Question 8 tested deliberation,
and Question 9 tested premeditation.
96. The “m” stands for mean score.
97. The “p” value refers to statistically significant levels.  Psychologists generally agree that
statistical significance of a test is indicated if the p value is less than .05. A p value between .05
and .07 indicates marginal significance of a test.
98. Chinese participants did not follow the same hierarchy.  Chinese responses indicated




However, because the MPC hierarchy results presented above ag-
gregated all four fact patterns that the participants scored, the results
do not mean that the mens rea hierarchy worked in each individual
case.  In order to test the possibility that the hierarchy worked only in
some cases, I computed means for each fact pattern and ran a series of
paired sample t-tests on American responses.  Examining mean re-
sponses separately in each of the four cases suggested that the hierar-
chy only held true once.  That is, for the same three supposedly
hierarchical MPC variables that I discussed above (purpose, knowl-
edge, and recklessness), the hierarchy held true only in one of four
fact patterns.  In two of the four cases, multiple paired sample t-tests
indicated that none of the MPC mental state categories significantly
differed from each other.  In the other fact pattern, participants scored
both knowledge and purpose as higher than recklessness (of marginal
significance).  But results did not indicate a significant difference be-
tween purpose and knowledge scores.
Table 1. American Judgments of MPC Mental States (by Case)
Purpose Knowledge Reckless
Case 1 4.04 3.90 3.97
Case 2 4.35• 4.27* 4.64*•
Case 3 5.01 5.02 4.91
Case 4 3.06* 3.77* 4.17*
* indicates statistical significance level of p<.05 comparing marked variables
within the case.
• indicates marginal statistical significance level of p=.07 comparing marked
variables within the case.
2. Mental States Generally.  Beyond examining the truth of the
MPC hierarchy, other aggregate mean results indicated that certain
mens rea responses emerged in unanticipated ways.  For example, the
supposedly analogous concepts of intent and purpose did not reveal
analogous results.  A paired samples T-test revealed that purpose
judgments were viewed as being a more serious (higher) mental state
than intent judgments.  These results emerged for both Americans
and Chinese, and for judgments relating to both hurting and killing
the victims (in each case, p<.01).
Beyond a basic examination of means, in order to further ex-
amine the relationship among all mental state judgments, I ran Pear-
son correlations to evaluate aggregate indices of the state of mind
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scores.  For American participants, all mental state indices signifi-
cantly correlated with each other, in each case p< .001.  Similarly, for
Chinese, almost all mental state indices significantly correlated with
each other (ranging from p< .001 to p< .05).99  These results, which
showed almost universal mental state correlations, are not surprising
and indicate that mental state judgments are at least related to one
another.  As I discuss later, I further examined the relationship of
these correlations through a linear regression analysis.
3. Cultural Differences.  To test cultural differences in mens rea
judgments, I conducted an analysis of variance on mental state judg-
ments.  A “one-way” ANOVA100 on the culture variable revealed sta-
tistically significant cultural differences on mental state judgments.
As demonstrated in Table 2, infra, Chinese consistently made higher
state of mind judgments than Americans, including judgments of ex-
treme recklessness, intent to kill, purpose to kill, knowledge, and
deliberation.
To test cultural differences in mock-jury guilty verdicts, I ran a
series of chi-square analyses.  These analyses revealed that Chinese
were statistically more likely than Americans to convict mock-defend-
ants for attempted murder on some of the criminal fact patterns,101
and for assault and battery on all fact patterns.102  In addition, Chinese
scored defendants as more guilty than Americans on guilty scale (0-
100) judgments for both attempted murder and assault and battery.
4. Analyzing the Process of Mens Rea Judgments.  Next, in order
to investigate participants’ state of mind determinations further, I ran
a series of multiple linear regression analyses (split by country) on
each of the state of mind questions.  These tests were designed so that
results would indicate the predictor variables for each state of mind
measure.  That is, they would allow me to understand what other eval-
uation judgments were used by participants when making particular
mental state judgments.  In addition to the nine mental state judg-
ments that participants answered, they also responded to several psy-
99. Only Chinese extreme recklessness and deliberation judgments were not significantly
correlated with each other.
100. A “one-way” test means that only one variable was isolated in testing variance.  In this
instance, I compared the results across the culture variable, comparing Americans with Chinese.
An ANOVA is a statistical test of analysis of variance.
101. Chinese were more likely than Americans to convict for attempted murder for fact pat-
terns 3 and 4.
102. Chinese were more likely to convict for assault and battery for all fact patterns, except
that results were only marginally significant for fact pattern one.
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Table 2 Mean and Standard Deviation of Indices by Culture
(ANOVA)
Chinese American
Indices Mean SD Mean SD F
Intent to Kill 3.25 .82 2.98 .97 5.15*
Intent to Hurt 4.61 1.10 4.36 1.16 2.73
Extreme Recklessness 4.93 1.06 4.11 1.30 26.00***
Reckless 4.27 1.05 4.42 1.22 1.01
Purpose to Hurt 4.36 1.09 4.11 1.17 2.78
Purpose to Kill 3.11 .82 2.84 .96 5.37*
Knowledge 4.74 1.03 4.24 1.11 12.48***
Deliberate 3.71 .85 2.92 .99 42.79***
Premeditate 4.05 1.03 3.94 1.13 .599
Att. Murder (0-100) 51.08 12.06 44.26 18.33 5.13*
Ass. & Batt. (0-100) 77.37 15.63 59.55 16.53 34.82***
Significance Values (Indicating Significant Differences Across Cultures)
*  p < .05
**  p < .01
*** p < .001
chological measures.  These measures included questions relating to
the morality and character of the actor, the actor’s deservingness of
punishment, and the victim’s right to compensation, among others.
By looking at the regression analysis for each mental state judgment, I
could see which other questions acted together to allow a statistically
significant prediction on the mental state judgment at issue.103  That is,
I could determine which questions, acting together, allow for a predic-
tion of a given mental state inquiry.
Results of a regression analysis on intent to kill judgments for
American participants indicated several variables that were statisti-
cally significant in predicting them, including purpose judgments,
knowledge judgments, and a psychological measure of “bad person”
judgments, a measure that was designed to test the role of an actor’s
character in perceivers’ decision-making.  By contrast, the regression
103. Because I tested so many mens rea judgments together (more than a jury would con-
sider at any one trial), my results do not match actual trial reasoning processes.  For example,
depending on the jurisdiction and charges, jurors asked about recklessness might not also be
asked about intent and extreme recklessness.  Therefore, processes will vary based on the “pack-
age” of inquiries in the particular jurisdiction.  In addition, though I tested the role of psycholog-
ical factors in mental state judgments, such judgments are not an explicit part of the legal
inquiry.  While these variables must be examined for their role in mental state judgments, the
variables I presented in this respect also do not match a true trial.
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on Chinese intent to kill judgments suggested two significant
predictors: purpose to kill judgments and premeditation judgments.
The significance of the “bad person” predictor in American judgments
indicates that intent to kill judgments relied in part on determinations
of an actor’s character.  For Chinese participants, predictors encom-
passed only other state of mind variables.
For knowledge judgments, regression results suggested that
American participants were more likely to believe that the defendant
acted with knowledge when they judged the action as immoral.  Such
a result once again raises the question of the degree to which judg-
ments of an actor’s moral character affect mental state judgments.  In
addition, the psychological measures of severity of punishment de-
served, how guilty the actor should feel, the responsibility of the vic-
tim for what happened, and bad person judgments all served as
predictors for knowledge judgments.  Thus, psychological factors
played a large role in judgments of an actor’s knowledge.  The mental
state judgments of intent to kill and purpose to hurt also served as
predictors of knowledge judgments.  For Chinese, intent to hurt and
deliberation judgments were the only significant predictors of knowl-
edge judgments.  Thus, Chinese mental state judgments were pre-
dicted once again only by other mental state judgments.104
In contrast to results on the intent to kill and knowledge vari-
ables, regression analysis on American recklessness judgments indi-
cated that other mental state judgments acted as the sole predictors,
with no psychological measures acting as predictors.  Intent to hurt
and extreme recklessness judgments served as significant predictors of
recklessness judgments.  For Chinese, judgments of responsibility of
the actor, another psychological measure, constituted the only signifi-
cant predictor of recklessness judgments.
5. Relationship between Guilty Judgments and Mens Rea.  I also
tested the relationship between guilty judgments and mens rea judg-
ments.  More specifically, I tested the predictor variables in guilty
scale judgments.  A series of linear regression analyses on attempted
murder scale judgments illuminates the process by which participants
made guilt determinations.  Analysis on American attempted murder
verdicts indicated two significant predictors of guilt: intent to kill and
extreme recklessness.  The premeditation variable was a marginally
104. For other variables, however, such as the purpose to kill variable, state of mind vari-
ables actually served as negative predictors for Chinese.  In that case, the premeditate factor
served as a negative predictor of purpose to kill.
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significant predictor.  These results appear to corroborate Finkel and
Groscup’s findings that culpability “begins and ends” with intentional-
ity.  Yet, only selected mental states predicted guilt.  Further research
must investigate the role of other mental state judgments in guilty ver-
dicts.  For Chinese responses, the regression revealed no individually
significant predictors of guilt for attempted murder, and only punish-
ment as a marginal predictor.
Results of a linear regression analysis on assault and battery
guilty scale judgments indicated three significant predictor variables
for Americans: extreme recklessness, deliberation, and monetary re-
lief.105  In contrast with the results for attempted murder, intent judg-
ments were not significant predictors of guilty scale judgments of
assault and battery.  Instead, other mental state judgments predicted
guilt.  For Chinese responses, the regression suggested two significant
predictors: intent to hurt and punishment.  Extreme recklessness was
a marginally significant predictor for Chinese responses.
Finally, I examined the relationship between guilty verdict judg-
ments and guilty scale judgments.  In particular, I calculated the mean
responses on the guilty scale for guilty and non-guilty judgments.
Such a calculation was intended to shed light on the question of how
guilty do jurors think defendants have to be before finding them
guilty.  Results indicated that, on average, Americans who judged de-
fendants guilty scored the defendant guilty 82.11 out of a possible 100.
Chinese scored the defendant guilty 78.61 out of a possible 100 (recall
that 0 stood for “definitely not guilty” and 100 stood for “definitely
guilty”).  For not-guilty judgments, Americans scored their average
not-guilty defendant as 25.91 out of 100, while Chinese scored their
average not guilty defendant as 27.43 out of 100.
E. Discussion of Results
The MPC mens rea hierarchy assumes that mental states function
incrementally.  Yet results indicated that, while the hierarchy gener-
ally succeeded when all fact pattern results were combined for statisti-
cal analysis, the hierarchy was not psychologically accurate in three
out of four individual fact patterns.  Legal commentators must ask
themselves whether these results are sufficient.  If the goal of the hier-
archy is to provide a framework that loosely represents American cog-
nitive understanding of mental states, it likely succeeds.  Yet if the
105. These judgments asked whether or not an injured party should financially recover.
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goal is to provide a legal structure that embraces a true model of
thought, the hierarchy likely fails.
Looking beyond the hierarchy, people decided supposedly similar
questions in different ways and decided supposedly different ques-
tions in similar ways.  The vacillation in predictor variables from ques-
tion to question indicated that subtle differences in mental state
inquiries had a more than subtle impact on decision-making processes.
Some of these predictor variables, such as “bad person” judgments
and immorality judgments,106 raise the question of whether irrelevant
personality traits or situational factors (such as the defendant’s race)
might lead to harsher mental state judgments through the workings of
unconscious biases.
The results also demonstrate the importance of understanding
culture in legal decision-making analysis.  As predicted, cultural dif-
ferences persisted throughout state of mind attributions as well as in
guilty judgments.  Both mean scores, as well as regression analyses,
indicated that Chinese make mental state judgments in different ways
than Americans.107  These culture-based results lead to two conclu-
sions.  First, cultural differences influence both state of mind processes
and decisions.108  Although results in the present experiment com-
pared two different nations (clearly relevant in international law),109
106. Results indicating the seemingly heavy reliance by Americans, rather than Chinese, on
morality of action judgments in state of mind attributions are surprising.  Previous psychological
research led me to predict that Chinese would generally focus more on notions of morality than
Americans would.
107. In almost all judgments, Chinese participants made higher state of mind attributions
than American participants.  Such mental state judgments went in the opposite direction from
my prediction.  One possible explanation for this trend is a stronger penal consciousness in
China.  Some Chinese historians have suggested that China’s legal history was penal in nature.
WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 10 (1995), citing DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN
IMPERIAL CHINA (1973), which characterized Chinese law as “overwhelmingly penal in empha-
sis.”  Alford disagreed with Bodde and Morris’ penal approach to Chinese law, instead empha-
sizing broader social principles.  The type of contextual explanation offered by Bodde and
Morris can help distinguish higher Chinese mental state attributions in the criminal context from
lower attributions relative to Americans found by researchers in other contexts. See Levinson et
al., supra note 4.
108. Despite the steps I took to safeguard against language differences, I cannot entirely rule
out the complexity of language or cultural-specific meanings as factors in various judgments and
related processes.  Yet, at least in the international law context, language gaps are real.  Stan-
dards should be sought that can overcome both cultural gaps as well as language gaps.
109. I would like to briefly mention the Chinese law implications of the results of Chinese
participants.  The regression results on Chinese participants’ attempted murder guilty scale judg-
ments, which indicated that Chinese mental state judgments did not predict guilt, raises some
issues regarding the Chinese legal system’s reliance on Western-like criminal laws in determining
guilt.  While the Chinese do not have laypersons as jurors, they do rely on judges’ ability to link
guilt determinations to mental states.  If Chinese cultural and psychological norms do not under-
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domestic law should also display sensitivity to cultural variances.  Fu-
ture research should seek to investigate whether and how cultural
background within the U.S. impacts state of mind determinations.  Le-
gal standards should not just work properly for a certain subset of a
population.
Because there is no true way to evaluate whether mens rea judg-
ments are being made “correctly” by one cultural group or another,
we must learn more about the cultural assumptions embedded in cer-
tain legal inquiries.  We know that culture influences mental state
judgments.  Now we must investigate how cultural differences are im-
pacted by variations within and across legal inquiries.  To do so re-
quires taking a critical look at our inquiries to ensure that they
accommodate cultural variation while accurately effectuating policy
goals.  A European American psychological point of view, embodied
in a mental state inquiry, is not conducive to achieving a just legal
system.  The correct view preserves policy goals while respecting cul-
tural differences.
Before jumping to conclusions about the inefficacy of legal
mental state inquiries, these results warrant a caution.  True jury trials
do not present over half a dozen mental states at once.  Instead, they
rely on the charge and the formulation in that jurisdiction.  The state
of mind judgments and predictor variables I tested thus do not directly
imitate the legal process.  Future research should be conducted in
more realistic legal situations, where fewer mental state terms are
presented in any one situation.
The results of the regression analysis on scaled guilty judgments
indicated that, as prior research has revealed generally, culpability
does in fact start with mental state judgments for Americans.  Not all
mental state judgments tested were significant predictors of guilt,
lie such imported legal notions, then their legal ideals will not be effectuated.  The Chinese
reliance on punishment as a predictor of guilt determinations (a marginally significant predictor)
indicates that perhaps scholars’ arguments that Chinese history has lead to a more penal empha-
sis rings true. See ALFORD, supra note 107, at 10.  In fact, such a contention would be consistent
with other results I have reported here, indicating that Chinese were more likely than Americans
to find defendants guilty and make higher mental state attributions. The results of the regression
on assault and battery, unlike the results on attempted murder, tended to indicate that Chinese
do in fact look to mental states when determining guilt.  In addition to the predictor of punish-
ment (which was present marginally in attempted murder judgments), the variables of intent to
hurt and extreme recklessness played roles in predicting guilt determinations.  These findings
raise hope that the mental-state based culpability standards of Chinese law are consistent with
Chinese cultural norms.  Yet further research is needed on Chinese lay understandings of crimi-




however.  For attempted murder judgments, knowledge, deliberation,
and purpose judgments did not generate a significant predictive effect
on guilt.  For assault and battery judgments, intent, purpose, and
knowledge judgments similarly failed to predict guilt.  These findings
indicate that the variety of mental states in American jurisprudence
do not equally impact guilt determinations.
V. CONCLUSION: BRIDGING PSYCHOLOGICAL
KNOWLEDGE AND LEGAL POLICY
The proliferation of legal standards based on policy considera-
tions has created a gap between legal standards and human decision-
making processes, particularly when it comes to understanding how
humans perceive others’ mental states.  By failing to investigate how
people make state of mind decisions in the legal setting, discussion of
mens rea and other mental state inquires have focused too narrowly
on policy and not enough on the psychological reality of legal stan-
dards.  Empirically investigating the relationship between law and
human cognitions is the first step in solving the problem.
The legal community must embrace cultural psychology’s empiri-
cal contribution.  The consistent development of psychological theory
demands investigation in the legal realm, driven by cross-cultural
studies indicating that cultural systems of thought continuously evoke
systematically different results.  The systematic nature of these results,
and the results I presented, calls for understanding and application.
The law must heed these calls.  When diversity of background contrib-
utes directly to diversity of thought, the law cannot blindly assume
that its substantive standards present culturally neutral instruments of
implementation.  The law’s instruments must be examined, honed,
and tuned.  They must evolve into culturally sensitive pieces that allow
for the workings of diversity within a neutral, understanding, and cul-
turally cognizant legal structure.
In this Paper, I have attempted to challenge the existing legal un-
derstanding of the human mind with new knowledge of the human
mind itself.  In criminal law and so many other contexts, the law
hinges judgment on an assumption that we can evaluate a person by
something that cannot be seen or touched, but something mental.  In
this way, the law recognizes part of the essence of humanity.  Psychol-
ogy has blessed us with both an emerging knowledge of this piece of
humanity and the cultural caution that its truths are not universal.  In-
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stead, its truths are vibrant, diverse, and ripe for discovery.  The law
has embedded psychology.  Perhaps psychology can help provide
greater meaning to the law.
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